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Christina Erneling

Professor emerita

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Why Second Language Learning is not First Language Learning

Author

  • Christina Erneling

Summary, in English

The Philosophical Investigations starts with a quotation from St. Augustine on language learning. The usual reconstruction of Wittgenstein's criticism of St. Augustine's view on language focusses on meaning — that is, the picture theory which he had in common with Wittgenstein's own earlier views. This paper shows that Wittgenstein in discussing ostensive definition, understanding, and the private language argument also attacks St. Augustine's notion of learning. In recent years the Augustinian conception has been resurrected in cognitive theories postulating an innate language of thought (e.g., Fodor), making Wittgenstein's claims that this conception of learning is paradoxical very relevant.

Publishing year

1993

Language

English

Pages

341-351

Publication/Series

Interchange

Volume

24

Issue

4

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Communication Studies

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0826-4805